We study the relation between the electorate's information about candidates' policy platforms during an election, and the subsequent provision of inefficient local public goods by the elected government. More information does not always lead to better outcomes. We show that the equilibrium outcome is efficient if voters are partially uninformed; whereas, if the electorate is very well informed, electoral competition leads candidates to provide inefficient local public goods in all equilibria.
During electoral campaigns, candidates running for office make policy proposals to woo voters. Voters pay only limited attention to electoral campaigns and as a result they do not become fully informed about the policies proposed by the candidates. We study the relation between the information acquired by the voters, and the policies that the candidates announce during the campaign and execute once in office. In particular, we explain the effect of voters' information on the provision of socially inefficient particularistic public goods (pork).
A particularistic or local public good provides a benefit only to the members of a single district or group. If the costs of provision are spread across society at large by general taxation, voters in each district want their own particularistic public good to be provided, while they prefer the public good in any other district not to be provided. Because voters enjoy the benefits of the public good provided to their own district fully, while they only pay a fraction of the cost of any given public good, they care more about the provision of their own good than about the non-provision of the public good in any one other given district. This leads politicians to promote inefficient policies that result in the over provision of particularistic public goods.
We find that a more informed electorate does not obtain a more efficient policy outcome. In fact, the efficient policy -no provision of pork-can be sustained in equilibrium if and only if the electorate is not well informed. If the electorate is better informed, all equilibria are inefficient, even if candidates also care about social efficiency along with their desire to gain office.
Examples of policies that distribute targeted goods of dubious efficiency abound: we highlight military procurement, farm subsidies, and infrastructure investments.
Parochial interests trump efficiency in contracts for military equipment. For instance, the U.S. Congress spent $65 billion from 1991 to 2009 to purchase new units of the F-22 jet fighter.
The Air Force deemed this jet unsuitable for any combat mission in the post-Soviet world, but building it provided 25,000 jobs in 44 states. 1 Policies such as continued purchases of F-22
fighters gain political support based on the funding and jobs they bring to specific districts, irrespective of their merit as a cost-efficient mean to satisfy military needs.
Procurement decisions degenerate into contests for pork that serve as local jobs programs.
Companies disperse production among multiple districts to maximize political support: Boeing promised to "create up to 50,000 jobs in 40 states" in its $40 billion contract to replace the US Air Force refueling tankers, which was awarded in 2011 after nine years of delays and controversies about fraud and waste. In Europe, production of the European Typhoon jet
fighter was assigned to countries in proportion to their procurement orders and not based on any measure of efficiency. And yet the dispersion of production among many districts that makes a project politically viable is precisely the cause of large cost overruns and delays (Younossi, Stem Lourell and Lussier [70] ). 2 Aside from military procurement, the cost effectiveness of some regionally targeted policies, including farm subsidies 3 and infrastructure projects such as railways, bridges and airports appears to often be rather questionable. 4, 5 An egregious example in the United States was the practice (halted in 2011) of approving earmarks, which allocate funds ($16 billion in 2010) to local projects avoiding the scrutiny and debate of regular appropriations. 6 In Australia, the National Audit Office censured the Conservative government in 2007, and the subsequent Labor government in 2010, for misallocation of public funds in regional development programs; in each case the opposition described these programs as "pork-barreling." 7 We investigate whether this inefficient allocation of funds occurs because voters are not sufficiently informed about policy details on projects that do not concern them directly. Since voters care most about policies that directly affect their districts, and the time or effort they can devote to learn about policy proposals is limited, they naturally become better informed about proposals that concern their district than about proposals for other districts that only affect them indirectly through general taxation.
One may conjecture that legislators support inefficient programs with targeted benefits and diffused because voters are imperfectly informed about these costs, and that wasteful, ineffi- 4 For inefficiencies in European railways, see Ginés and Inglada [30] . For an example, the high-speed rail line between Cuenca and Albacete (opened in 2011) attracted an average of nine (9) passengers a day until service was suspended ("Spain cuts high speed 'ghost train' " from The Telegraph, June 28, 2011) . For the US, see Edward Glaeser, "Running the numbers on High-Speed Trains", in the Economix blog at The New York Times, August 4, 2009. For a critique of the patronage system under the Indian Ministry of Railways (which employs 1.5 million workers), see "Why do Bihari politicians love railway ministry" from The Indian Express, June 13, 2004 . 5 For commentary on the political rather than economic nature of the rationale to build the Humber Bridge (northeast England), opened in 1981 at a cost of £151 million, see "Humber Bridge set to be electoral bribe again" in The Telegraph, April 7, 2010 . For a critique of subsidies to regional airports in the UK and to the airlines serving them, see "England's pork barrel politics is paying for airlines to burn the planet," in The Guardian, July 6, 2009. 6 See The Pig Book published by Citizens Against Government Waste at www.cagw.org for a yearly detail of earmarks. 7 See "Auditor slams ALP pork barrel" The Australian, July 28, 2010; "PM rolls out his own pork barrel," The Australian, June 3, 2008; Report No.14, 2007-08 on the Regional Partnerships program (worth $410million) and Report No.3, 2010-11 on the Regional and Local Community Infrastructure program (worth $550 million), both available at www.anao.gov.au. cient or distortive spending on public goods would disappear if only voters were fully informed.
Indeed, this is the prediction of the theories on the relation between transparency and government spending surveyed by Eslava [27] (including Rogoff and Sibert [60] , Rogoff [59] , and Alt and Lassen [2] ). Gavazza and Lizzeri [42] similarly argue that there would be no inefficient geographically targeted spending if voters were fully informed. 8 We show that this intuition is incomplete. We argue that information does not solve the problem of wasteful targeted spending. On the contrary, a fully informed (and fully rational) electorate divided into districts elects politicians who promise and provide inefficient local spending. Does more information at least alleviate the problem? Does a more informed electorate obtain more efficient policy outcomes?
To answers these questions, we find the equilibrium policy proposals in an election with two candidates and an imperfectly informed electorate partitioned into multiple districts. Candidates compete by proposing to implement local public good projects that are inefficient for society, but beneficial to the district in which they are developed. We assume that the candidate who wins in most districts wins the election and implements her policy proposal. The model fits Westminster-style parliamentary elections, and indirect Presidential elections in which votes are aggregated by district, as in the U.S. through the Electoral College. We capture the electorate's imperfect information by assuming that voters are informed about proposals for local public good projects in their own district, while they only observe proposals for other districts with some 8 The belief that a more informed electorate would demand and obtain a reduction in wasteful targeted spending seems to be shared by activists outside academia: the 501(c)(4) non-profit Taxpayers Against Earmarks (recently renamed Ending Spending), which according to its mission statement, "is dedicated to educating and engaging American taxpayers about wasteful and excessive government spending," believes that "information is the best tool we have to combat the debt crisis and hold politicians accountable."
probability. This probability is our measure of the electorate's level of information. Voters who remain uninformed about proposals in other districts form beliefs about these other proposals based on the proposal they observe in their district.
Our main results concern local public goods that are inefficient, so we refer to them as pork, but are not very inefficient. Loosely, in a society with many districts, this is pork that provides between 51cts. and 99cts. per unit of cost. Formally, in a society with n districts, we say pork is not very inefficient if it provides between n+1 2n and 1 units of benefit per unit of cost. Very inefficient porl is such that providing it to any majority of districts makes this majority worse off even though the costs are shared equally by all districts in society.
If pork is not very inefficient, the efficient equilibrium (no provision of pork) holds only if the electorate is imperfectly informed. Too much information affects incentives perversely and destroys efficiency. We show this by example.
Example 1 Assume there are 2 candidates, and 3 districts, and that a local public good in a district generates 80cts of benefit to this district, no benefit to any other district, and 33.3cts of cost to each district (1 unit total cost). The efficient policy is not to provide any local public goods. Assume voters always know what candidates offer in their district.
First, consider an electorate with low information in which voters do not know what candidates offer to other districts. An efficient equilibrium in which candidates offer no local public goods holds. In this equilibrium, voters anticipate candidates not to offer local public goods, and if they observe a candidate J deviate to offer to provide the local public good to their district, they believe that J is likely to have made the same offer to other districts as well; if voters believe that J has made the same offer to all three districts, they expect a net welfare change of 80cts -3×33.3cts= -20cts if J is elected, so they reject the deviation, and the efficient equilibrium holds. Other equilibria hold as well if the electorate has low information.
In contrast, if the electorate if fully informed and voters know what candidates offer to each district, the efficient equilibrium can be defeated by offering to provide the local public good to two districts, whose voters obtain a net gain of 80cts -2×33.3cts= 13cts, and hence vote for the deviating candidate.
The unsettling conclusion is that some degree of voters' ignorance is necessary to sustain the efficient policy outcome.
If candidates care to any degree about efficiency, and not only about winning office, we obtain a stronger result: an intermediate level of information emerges, in which all inefficient equilibria fail, while the efficient equilibrium holds. This intermediate level of information is then optimal, as it assures an efficient policy outcome, while more information is unambiguously detrimental, as it leads to inefficient policies. In the next three paragraphs I explain the intuition for this result.
Given any pair of equilibrium strategies by the two candidates, there is a deviation by candidate J such that she wins if the electorate is fully informed, and loses otherwise. It follows that if the electorate is fully informed with sufficiently high probability, all pure strategy equilibria fail, because either candidate can deviate and win with high probability.
Assume J cares about efficiency, so that J is willing to sacrifice some probability of victory in order to win with a more efficient policy proposal when she wins. Consider first an inefficient equilibrium (with provision of local public goods), in which J wins with probability 50%. J deviates if the probability that the electorate is informed (and J wins after deviating) is sufficiently high. In fact, since the equilibrium is inefficient and J cares about efficiency, a probability below but close to 50% that the electorate is informed suffices for J to deviate and destroy this inefficient equilibrium. Now consider instead the efficient (no local public goods) equilibrium: J only deviates (necessarily to an inefficient policy proposal) if the probability that the electorate is fully informed and J wins after deviating is sufficiently greater than 50% to compensate J for the loss of efficiency embodied in the deviation.
In short, if candidates care about efficiency, relatively little information suffices to destroy any inefficient pure equilibria, while it takes more information to destroy the efficient equilibrium. Hence, for an intermediate level of information, whose range depends on the intensity of candidates' concern for efficiency, the unique pure equilibrium is the efficient one with no provision of inefficient local public goods. More information reduces aggregate welfare, as it destroys the efficient equilibrium and makes candidates play an equilibrium in mixed strategies, which is inefficient.
Seminal contributions to the literature on distributive politics by Weingast [68] , Shepsle and Weingast [64] , and Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen [69] analyze the provision of local inefficient public goods as the result of a legislative bargaining game, and predict that legislators commit to a norm of universalism by which every district gets its own inefficient project. One wonders why legislators do not embrace instead a Pareto-superior universalist norm by which no inefficient local public goods are ever provided. If legislators do not commit to any norm, only a minimal winning majority of districts receive pork (Baron [9] ). More recent developments study how pork provision is affected by the activism of lobbies and special interest groups (Grossman and Helpman [33] ), the number of districts in the polity (Baqir [8] ; Primo and Snyder [55] and Chen and Malhotra [19] ), by term limits (Herron and Shotts [35] ), or by the distribution of legislators' preferences for local or collective public goods (Volden and Wiseman [67] [65] and Huber and Ting [37] ). These theories assume that citizens are fully informed about the policy proposals made by candidates. The assumption is unrealistic. The empirical literature on voter behavior has conclusively established that in practice voters have at best a sketchy idea of these policy proposals (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes [17] ; Bartels [11] and Alvarez [3] ).
At the opposite extreme, Grosser and Palfrey [32] assume that citizens do not know anything about the candidates. Baron [10] and Gul and Pesendorfer [34] assume that some voters are fully informed, while others are uninformed about policy proposals. Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro [31] assume that each voter becomes either informed or uninformed about the policy proposal of each candidate separately. The assumption that a voter is either fully informed or fully uninformed is stark: voters in large elections possess some information about candidates' policy proposals and they use their limited information to decide how to vote (Bullock [14] ). Instead of studying fully informed or fully uninformed voters, it is more appropriate to build theories of elections with imperfectly informed voters. Voters who do not directly observe candidates' preferences or policy positions may infer them indirectly from polls and endorsements (McKelvey and Ordeshook [46] and [47] ) or party labels (Snyder and Ting [66] ). Assuming voters face uncertainty about candidates' preferences, Dhami [23] studies general redistribution from rich to poor agents, and Bernhard, Dubey and Hughson [13] introduce exogenous, fixed transfers from districts with a junior representative to districts with a senior representative. All these models deal with ideological preferences on the real line. 9 Egorov [26] analyzes the principalagent problem of motivating politicians to exert effort toward providing public goods. Aidt and Shvets [1] care about selecting high type politicians and motivating them to exert effort, but they do not study the strategic formulation of policy proposals, assuming instead that effort and type translate mechanically into funds for local public goods.
A closer reference is the redistributive theory by Gavazza and Lizzeri [42] . Our theory differs from theirs in the modeling assumptions, the solution concept, and the results. Gavazza and
Lizzeri [42] assume that candidates maximize their expected share of votes, which implies that candidates are exclusively opportunistic and do not care about policy, and that the electoral rule is proportional representation. We generalize candidate motivations, letting candidates care about winning and also about the policies they enact, and we allow for varying intensity 9 Other models consider electorates that are not perfectly informed about the state of the world (Austen-Smith [6] , Feddersen and Pesendorfer [28] ) or about candidates' competence or character (Kartik and McAfee [38] ), or allow candidates to deviate from their campaign proposals once in office (Banks [7] and Callander and Wilkie [15] ). These models are more distantly related because they do not deal with distributive policies, and assume that voters are perfectly informed about candidates' announcements.
of policy concern across candidates; one candidate may care a lot about policy, while another cares little or not at all. We assume that the electoral rule is district by district plurality rule (as in India, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and many others, see
Cox [21] ). With regard to the solution concept, Gavazza and Lizzeri's [42] model yields a vast multiplicity of equilibria, and they deal with this problem by assuming passive beliefs. We obtain uniqueness (for some parameter values) without need to resort to any dubious selection criterion, and we provide a clear comparative static: the policy outcome under full information delivers lower aggregate social welfare than the outcome obtained if the electorate is partially uninformed. This result contrasts with Gavazza and Lizzeri's [42] , whose theory reduces to a two-period version of Lindbeck and Weibull [40] and predicts full efficiency if the electorate is fully informed.
Our contribution is the first electoral theory of inefficient local public good provision that applies to electoral systems with single-member districts and recognizes that voters have only partial information about candidates' policy proposals. It obtains sharp results, it allows candidates to have heterogeneous and hybrid motivations, caring both for winning office and for the efficiency of the policies they enact, and it predicts that a fully informed electorate obtains policy outcomes that are less efficient than those obtained by a partially informed electorate.
The Model
We consider a society partitioned into an odd number n ≥ 3 of subsets, with one representative voter i in each subset. We refer to these subsets as districts, but they could also be population groups of similar size divided by ethnicity, age, profession or class.
Two candidates A and B compete for election. Let J ∈ {A, B} denote an arbitrary candidate and let −J denote the other candidate, so that {J, −J} ≡ {A, B} . We assume that candidates and voters are fully strategic, rational agents who evaluate lotteries according to standard expected utilities.
The policy space consists on whether or not to provide a public good in each district. 10 A strategy for each candidate consists on proposing a policy in the policy space. Let
n be the set pure strategies for each candidate. Let s J ∈ {0, 1} n be a pure strategy by candidate J, where s The timing is simple:
One -Candidates announce their policy proposals simultaneously.
Two -Nature determines how much information voters get about these proposals, as detailed below.
Three -An election is held, where voters simultaneously choose to vote for A, for B or to abstain.
Four -The candidate who receives most votes, or a randomly selected candidate in case of a tie, wins the election and implements her policy proposal. 10 The theory is robust if we enrich the policy space to include an ideological dimension over which voters have single-peaked preferences, or a quantity g to invest on the provision of a public good that benefits all districts equally. As long as utilities over ideology or national public good, and pork, are additively separable, both candidates would choose their equilibrium proposals on ideology and the collective public good, and competition over provision of local public goods would proceed as analyzed in this paper.
Each local public good brings a benefit β to the voter in the district where it is provided and no benefit to the other districts. The cost of each local public good is identical across districts and is normalized to one. All the costs of providing local public goods are equally borne by all voters, regardless of which districts actually receive their local public good.
We assume that local public good projects are inefficient, so no district would like to provide its own public good if it had to bear its full cost, but we assume that projects are sufficiently efficient so that, ceteris paribus, each voter prefers to have the public good provided in her district given that the district bears only . If candidate J proposes to provide the public good in k districts, not including district i, then voter i's expected utility is equal to − k n . The expectation is over k, which may be unknown to the voter.
We assume that voters vote for the candidate with the highest expected payoff, that is, voters are sequentially rational (Kreps and Wilson [39] ). We assume that voters do not use weakly dominated strategies. This rules out equilibria in which all voters vote for the same candidate even though some voters prefer the losing candidate's proposal. If the expected payoffs of both candidates for voter i coincide given voter i 0 s beliefs, voter i is indifferent about the candidates.
We assume that in this case she abstains, unless abstention has been eliminated as a weakly dominated strategy.
We consider two possible motivations for a candidate: we assume that candidates care about winning office, and we allow but do not require that candidates also care about the efficiency of the policies they enact once in office. We say that a candidate is purely office motivated if winning office is her exclusive concern: her utility is one if she wins, zero if she loses. We say that a candidate is efficiency concerned if she values winning, but she prefers to win proposing and implementing more efficient policies. Let k the number of districts in which candidate J proposes to provide the local public good. Candidate J 0 s preferences are represented by the utility function:
U J (k) = 0 otherwise.
We let parameter α J take any non-negative value. The special case α J = 0 corresponds to purely office motivated candidates. The term (1 − β)k measures the inefficiency of a policy that provides the local public good in k districts, and the utility obtained by an efficiency concerned candidate with α J > 0 if she wins proposing such policy decreases with (1 − β)k and α J .
We allow for heterogeneity in candidates' motivations, i.e. we allow for any (a A , α B ) ∈ R 2 + .
All previous electoral theories on distributive politics or local public good provision assume that candidates have homogenous motivations: either all candidates care only about winning (Person and Tabellini [54] ), or they all care about both winning and policy outcomes (McKelvey and Riezman [48] ). Roemer [58] , Aragones and Palfrey [4] and Callander [16] introduce heterogenous motivations to the classical one dimensional spatial model. 12 To the best of our knowledge, our theory is the first to allow for heterogenous candidate motivations in an electoral theory of distributive politics or pork provision.
The solution concept we use is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which no agent uses weakly dominated strategies. We fully characterize the set of pure strategy equilibria. Equilibrium existence is assured (see Appendix); if there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibria must be in mixed strategies.
We analyze how voters modify their behavior in response to changes in their information about candidates' proposals. We assume that each voter is informed about candidates' proposals to provide the local public good in the voter's district, but voters are less well informed about proposals to provide local public goods in other districts. Our motivation is that voters with a limited attention to policy proposals for local public good projects focus on those that are most relevant to them, namely, those in their district. Local media facilitate this selective attention by highlighting the proposals that directly affect a local constituency.
Empirical evidence supports our assumption that citizens are more informed about campaign proposals that target their district, than about proposals that target other districts. The 13 We conjecture that this asymmetry in information is even more pronounced on issues such as investment on public goods with a purely local dimension, which are not included in national surveys precisely because the interest they elicit is purely local.
Our motivation for imperfect information is inattention by voters, not strategic withholding of information by candidates. In an extension (available from the authors), we show that if we allow for strategic communication by candidates, any piece of information that would affect an election is strategically announced either by candidate A or by candidate B. In the benchmark model we directly assume that all information is announced: imperfect information arises not because candidates withhold information, but because voters do not pay careful attention and may fail to apprehend available information that does not directly pertain to their district.
We parameterize how informed is the electorate by a single parameter π, which captures the probability that all voters are perfectly informed. Nature determines whether candidates' policy proposals become common knowledge or not. Policy proposals become common knowledge with probability π ∈ [0, 1]. With probability 1 − π, each voter i ∈ {1, ..., n} only observes what candidates commit to do in her district, and she is completely unaware of what candidates propose to provide in other districts. The extreme case π = 1 corresponds to a model with perfect information, and π = 0 corresponds to an electorate in which voters only have local information about the proposals for their district, and never learn about the proposals to provide public goods in other districts. Qualitative results are robust if we let each district become informed with independent probability π i = π, or if we relax the assumption that voters are always informed about proposals in their district; we discuss these and other extensions below.
Let p J ∈ {0, 1} n be the policy actually proposed (action taken) by candidate J, and let The set of equilibria depend on the efficiency of the public goods measured by β; on how informed is the electorate, measured by π; and on candidates' care for efficiency, measured by α A and α B .
Results
We say that local public goods are very inefficient if they are worth less than a fraction , it is the unique pure equilibrium.
We relegate to the Appendix section all the proofs, together with more extensive results including a full characterization of the set of pure equilibria. 15 Inefficient equilibria exist if the electorate is poorly informed; even the least efficient policy in which all districts receive their inefficient local public good can be obtained as an equilibrium outcome. 16 This least efficient equilibrium is the one that would be selected using passive beliefs (McAfee and Schwartz [45] ) as a selection criterion. A voter holds passive beliefs if her posterior about the candidates' offers to other districts does not change when she observes an out-of-equilibrium offer to her district. Alternatively, the efficient equilibrium is selected using symmetric beliefs as a selection criterion. A voter holds symmetric beliefs if her posterior after observing a deviation is that the candidate has made the same offer to all districts. We find little theoretical and no empirical support for either selection criterion; in fact, the existing empirical tests on selection using these criteria yield negative results (Martin, Normann and Snyder [43] ).
We therefore do not use these -or any other-selection criterion: if multiple equilibria exist for some parameters, we characterize the set of all equilibria (see the Appendix).
Our main interest and focus is on local public goods that are inefficient, but not too inefficient, so that their benefit/cost ratio is closer to one, and in particular, it is above n+1 2n
. If local public goods provide enough benefit so that a minimal winning majority of districts would like to provide the public goods to itself making all districts pay for the cost through general taxation, 15 We also show in the Appendix that if β ∈ ¡ 1 n , n+1 2n ¢ and π > 1 2 , the efficient equilibrium is the unique symmetric equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies. 16 This multiplicity of equilibria is an instance of a general result on multilateral contracts: when one of many downstream agents does not receive the offer she expects from the upstream player and she does not observe the offers made to other downstream players, the downstream player's beliefs about the other offers are not pinned down by sequential equilibrium (Segal [62] , McAfee and Schwartz [45] ).
then the efficient outcome with no provision of these inefficient goods cannot always be sustained in equilibrium, not even if one or both candidates care about efficiency.
Proposition 2
propose to provide no local public goods;
, the efficient equilibrium is the unique pure equilibrium; and
< π, all equilibria are in mixed strategies and inefficient.
Part i) of Proposition 2 refers to poorly informed voters, who are unlikely to know the true proposals at the time of voting. Their votes more often than not depend on their out-ofequilibrium beliefs: very different equilibria can be sustained given voters' beliefs such that any voter observing a deviation in her districts believes the worst about the deviating candidate.
Equilibria in which both candidates propose not to provide the inefficient local public good to any district, and equilibria in which both candidates propose to provide it to every district, exist and are sequential (Kreps and Wilson [39] ) and trembling hand perfect (Selten [63] ).
These and other equilibria are sustained for any β ∈ ¡ n+1 2n , 1 ¢ by the following voters' beliefs off the equilibrium path: a voter who observes a deviation in her district believes that the deviating candidate has proposed to provide the public good to all other districts. Given these beliefs, no voter votes for a deviating candidate unless information is fully revealed. It follows that if the probability that full information is revealed is low, deviating is never profitable. With 17 In the Appendix we provide the exact expression of γ as a function of π, n , β, α A and α B , and in particular we show that if at least one candidate cares about efficiency (α J > 0), then γ < a poorly informed electorate, comparative statics on β show that if local public goods become more inefficient -if β decreases-, the efficient equilibrium can be sustained by a larger set of off-equilibrium beliefs: the efficient equilibrium holds if each voter who observes a deviation believes that the deviator proposes to provide the local public good to at least nβ − 1 other districts. In future work we plan to test in experiments which, if any, of the multiple equilibria do subjects play.
As noted in part ii), an increase from low to intermediate information is at least weakly beneficial because it makes the efficient equilibrium unique: if the probability that voters become informed is close to one half, candidates concerned about efficiency are willing to deviate to a more efficient policy and win only if their deviation is observed by the electorate. This willingness to deviate, even if deviating means winning with probability less than one half, destroys all the inefficient equilibria. By a similar argument, candidates are not willing to deviate from the efficient equilibria by proposing to provide the local public good to a minimal winning majority of districts if the probability that this deviation is observed is only slightly greater than one half. While the exact bounds of this interval depend on the efficiency of local public goods (β), and on how much candidates care about efficiency, the relevant intuition is that the lower limit of the interval is below one half, and the higher limit is above one half.
Part iii) of Proposition 2 shows that if the probability that citizens are informed is sufficiently high, the efficient equilibrium breaks down. For π sufficiently large, equilibria must be in mixed strategies and in expectation inefficient local public goods are provided. The result is more intuitive than it might initially appear to be. Suppose that both candidates play pure strategies. At least one of the two candidates wins the election with probability at most 1 2 . However, if citizens are fully informed, simple majority generates a Condorcet cycle: for any pure strategy, there exists another pure strategy that defeats it. 18 Each candidate could deviate to the strategy that defeats her opponent's strategy, and in this manner win whenever Nature reveals the policy proposals, which occurs with probability π; hence if π is sufficiently high, the initial (arbitrary) strategy pair cannot be supported in equilibrium, because even a candidate who also cares about efficiency would deviate to an inefficient policy proposal that wins the election with sufficiently high probability. The efficient outcome can only be obtained if citizens are not very well informed.
Proposition 2 holds if concerns for efficiency vary across candidates. The result is robust
if each candidate's type (α J ) is private information: too much information strictly reduces aggregate welfare. The intuition is unchanged: if π is below but close to one half, a candidate concerned about efficiency deviates to a more efficient policy and wins if the deviation is observed by all voters, destroying any equilibrium but the efficient one. This result holds as soon as at least one candidate cares at least infinitesimally about the efficiency of the policy she enacts. As candidates care more about efficiency, it becomes easier to sustain the efficient equilibrium, and harder to sustain inefficient equilibria, so the range of parameter pairs for which the efficient equilibrium can be sustained, and the range for which it is the unique pure equilibrium, expand if α A and α B increase. Nevertheless, for any (α A , α B ), there is some β < 1 such that if the electorate is sufficiently well informed, all equilibria are inefficient. 18 Proposing to provide the local public good to no district is defeated by proposing to provide it to n+1 2 districts, and for any k > 0, proposing to provide it to k districts is defeated by proposing to provide it to k − 1 out of those k districts.
Corollary 3 and Figure 1 illustrate Proposition 2 in a society with three districts.
Corollary 3 Assume n = 3 and α A = α B = 1. Then, for any β ∈ ¡ n+1
, multiple equilibria exist, including the efficient one in which both candidates propose not to provide local public goods;
ii) if
− β, the efficient equilibrium is the unique pure equilibrium; and iii) if As shown in Figure 1 , if public goods are inefficient but not too inefficient, some degree of voters' ignorance is necessary to sustain an efficient outcome. Too much information is strictly detrimental, as it destroys the efficient equilibrium and leads to inefficient outcomes that reduce the ex-ante welfare of each voter. If citizens are well informed, the efficient proposal is defeated by any proposal that provides the public good to a minimal winning majority of districts.
Equilibria are in mixed strategies, and thus inefficient. For a society with three districts, in the parameter region with no pure equilibrium, in expectation each district receives its local public good with probability at least 3/7 (calculations are available from the authors).
In summary, an efficient policy outcome can be sustained in equilibrium if and only if the electorate is not well informed, and this lack of information makes a promise to offer local public goods only to a minimal winning majority of districts unverifiable and not thus not credible.
The policy outcome is guaranteed to be efficient in the unique pure equilibrium if information π is at an intermediate interval; this interval increases in size with candidates' concerns for efficiency. Only in the limit case in which α A = a B = 0 so that neither candidate cares about anything but winning office, the intermediate interval disappears (its limits converge to 1 2 ) and the efficient equilibrium is not unique for any π.
Extensions and Robustness
We check that the intuition underpinning our results is robust to several extensions and generalizations, including the following: a) A relaxation of the assumption that voters are perfectly informed about proposals to provide the local public good in the voter's district, assuming instead that each voter is informed about her district with greater probability than about other districts. b) A theory with asymmetric districts, so that one district is more informed or less informed than the others. A precise formulation and proof of each of the claims regarding extensions a) through h) is available from the authors, along with a characterization of all pure strategy equilibria, including the special case with π = 0; a proof that all the equilibria are extensive form rationalizable (Pearce [53] and Battigali [12] ); a characterization of the set of trembling hand perfect (Selten [63] ) and proper (Myerson [50] ) equilibria for the case with two purely office motivated candidates; a characterization of symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for the set of parameters for which there is no pure strategy equilibrium with n = 3 and α A = α B ∈ {0, 1}; and an extension of the theory to the dual problem of underprovision of efficient local public goods if β > 1.
Discussion
We have developed a theory on the provision of inefficient particularistic goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We argue that citizens are better informed about government expenditures in their own district (which they favor) than about government expenditure in other districts (which they oppose). We analyze how this informational bias affects the provision of socially inefficient local public goods.
If particularistic goods are very inefficient, returning less than c) If voters are very well informed, there is no pure strategy equilibrium because majority preferences exhibit a Condorcet cycle, and each candidate is then always able to best respond to any pure strategy by the other candidate by crafting a proposal that is more beneficial to a simple majority of districts. Equilibria are inefficient and in mixed strategies.
We therefore find that too much information makes every voter ex-ante worse off.
In a survey on the role of the media, Stromberg and Prat [56] argue that an electorate that ignores what is the state of the world may become worse off if it gains information about candidates' actions but not about outcomes, because it makes candidates' pander by choosing actions that match the prior of the voter about the right action to take (Maskin and Tirole [44] , Ashworth and Shotts [5] ). In their framework, the electorate would always be better off learning about outcomes. We identify a novel channel by which information hurts the electorate:
without any uncertainty about the state of the world, an informed electorate induces candidates to use mix strategies and propose inefficient policies that target benefits to specific districts, which ex-ante makes every voter worse off.
Our results have normative implications with regard to voter education: making the electorate fully informed does not suffice and in fact harms the prospects of obtaining efficient policies from the political process.
Appendix
This file contains an appendix to the manuscript "On the Efficiency of Partial Information in Elections", resubmitted for consideration for publication in the Journal of Politics.
This online Appendix continues the exposition contained in the body of the paper, and it uses definitions, notation, results and cross-references to other sections in the manuscript.
In this Appendix we provide the following: a) Survey evidence in support of our assumption of uneven awareness about issues. b) A complete characterization of equilibria in pure strategies for any β ∈ ¡ 1 n , n+1 2 ¢ and for A solution for symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for n = 3 and (α A , a B ) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)} is available from the authors upon request. 19 Additional results discussed in section 3 with generalizations and extensions to alternative assumptions on candidates' motivations, asymmetric districts, alternative informational assumptions, different solution concepts, or π = 0 are also available from the authors.
Evidence of Uneven Awareness
We assume that voters are more informed about proposals for projects in their district, than about proposals for projects to be executed in other districts. An implication of our assumption is that given a proposal to execute a project in a given district, voters in this district are better informed about the project than voters from other districts.
We searched for survey data from 2007 to 2012 about six prominent policy proposals to be executed in specific districts or that disproportionately affect specific districts in the US: the Detroit auto industry bailout, offshore drilling, the extension of the Keystone XL pipeline, the deepening of the Savannah harbor, plans for high speed rail, and plans to reinforce security along 19 Note to editors: we will post these solutions on our own academic websites.
the Mexican border. We found national surveys that ask factual questions testing respondents' knowledge about the issues for three of these policies: offshore drilling, securing the border, and the auto bailout.
The 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey asked a factual question (question CDd08)
on campaign proposals to secure the border to 6,864 subjects, and it asked a factual question In each of the three questions, respondents from the state(s) directly affected by the policy were more informed. We checked that this is result is not driven by citizens of these six states being generally better informed about all issues: these states perform no better and in fact generally worse than the rest of the US in answering the two questions that do not directly affect Louisiana  108  163  45  104  6  18  Michigan  316  524  88  200  19  26  Texas  496  837  154  390  39  72  New Mexico  58  94  23  44  7  9  Arizona  124  212  73  127  11  20  California  879  1462  354  681  56  107  US Total  8613  15048  3074  6864  581  1003   Table 3 : Observation count, by question and state.
Proofs
To simplify notation, and given that voters' strategies are straightforward when full information is revealed, in all the analysis below we implicitly assume that if Nature fully reveals the policy proposals, voters vote according to their preferences and abstain when indifferent. This allows us to focus our analysis of voters on the branches of the game in which Nature does not reveal the full information so that voters face uncertainty. 20 For each voter i ∈ {1, ..., n}, let s i :
{0, 1} × {0, 1} −→ {A, B, ∅} be a behavioral strategy for voter i, which is a function that maps each information set of the voter when Nature does not reveal the policy proposals fully, into an action by the voter. A complete strategy for the voter specifies s i , and the actions to be taken when information is fully revealed. We also express s i as a vector s i = (s Because the number of players is finite, and each player has a finite number of possible strategies, the game is finite, and hence an equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies) exists (see for instance Myerson [52] pg. 177).
All equilibria that exist for π ∈ ¡ 0, First we present some preliminary results.
Lemma 4
If π > 0, in any pure strategy equilibrium, both candidates win with equal probability.
Proof. Consider any candidates' strategy pair (s A , s B ) such that candidate J wins with probability less than 1 2 . Since in equilibrium voters hold correct beliefs, the probability that J wins conditional on full information being revealed, or not revealed, is less than 1 2 in each case. In pure strategies, given the assumption hat voters abstain whenever indifferent, the probability of victory is in the set {0, 1 2 , 1} so if it is less than 1 2 , it is zero. Deviating to s J = s −J , candidate J ties the election if full information is revealed, so the probability of winning is at least π 2
.
Since for any candidate type, to win with positive probability gives a positive payoff, there is no equilibrium where a candidate wins with zero probability.
Lemma 5
If π > 0, in any pure strategy equilibrium both candidates propose to carry out the same number of projects.
Proof. By lemma 4, both candidates win with equal probability. If nβ is not an integer, and candidates propose to implement a different number of projects, then no voter is indifferent between the two candidates, and hence no voter abstains, so that either A or B win for sure, which is a contradiction. If
= k, then again no voter is indifferent and no voter abstains, so either A or B win for sure. If¯n
without loss of generality that that is, voter i believes candidate J proposes to carry out a project in every other district. Therefore if there were no profitable deviation under the original beliefs there are no profitable deviation when each voter i has beliefs B1.
Next we present a characterization of pure strategy equilibria for any . 
s B i = x and one of the three following sets of conditions holds: , full information is not revealed, and given out of equilibrium beliefs B1, it follows that voter i votes for B and A loses the election.
Consider any deviation such that x 0 < x projects are proposed. This deviation is most profitable for B, so assume B deviates. Given, voters' beliefs, this deviation can be profitable only if full information is revealed. It follows that the most profitable deviation for an efficiency concerned candidate is to propose zero projects. This deviation is profitable if and only if
but N 00 6 = ∅. Suppose A deviates to offer
. Since x > (1 − β)n then voter i votes for A. This deviation is profitable if and only if
Suppose A deviates to offer zero projects. This deviation is profitable if and only if
For all x and all α A , π 0 ≥ π 00 and there is always a profitable deviation. Hence there is no equilibrium with out of equilibrium beliefs B1, but then by lemma 7, there is no equilibrium. . Suppose A deviates to offers
to a voter i ∈ N 01 ; whether or not full information is revealed, voter i prefers B and continues to vote for B and other voters either do not observe the deviation or if they do, they now have a lower expected utility from A winning, so A loses by deviating since she is proposing more projects. When full information is not revealed, and given out of equilibrium beliefs B1, each voter i who observes a deviation from candidate J votes for −J. So candidate J can only find a deviation that is profitable when full information is revealed. The most profitable deviation is such that candidate B proposes x 0 projects such thats
. This deviation is profitable if and only if
Hence an equilibrium holds if
Notice that the right hand side is strictly greater than . The most profitable deviation is to propose zero project, in which case the deviator wins if information is fully revealed, and loses otherwise. The deviation is profitable for B if and only if
Case 5. Assume x ∈ [nβ, n] and N 00 = ∅. The most profitable deviation is to propose zero projects. This deviation is profitable for B if and only if
Corollary 9 Assume π ∈ ¡ 0, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. First of all it is easy to check that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies with x > 0 if π > , if information is not revealed, any voter who observes a deviation by J prefers −J and hence J loses with probability at least 1 2 , hence the deviation is again not profitable.
Assume α B > 0 and π = 1 2
. By Corollary 5, both candidates must propose the same number of projects in equilibrium and win with equal probability. Assume they propose x > 0. Then B can deviate to propose x − 1 projects and win the election when information is revealed, with probability 1 2 , which is a profitable deviation for B.
The following claim establishes equilibrium uniqueness for π > , the unique pure equilibrium, and the unique symmetric equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies is the efficient equilibrium with no pork.
Proof. Claim 11 established that the efficient equilibrium holds. By Lemma 5, in a pure strategy equilibrium, both candidates propose the same number of projects and win with equal probability. If the number of projects is strictly positive, either candidate can deviate to the efficient policy and win with probability π > 1 2
. Hence there is no pure equilibrium in which candidates propose pork to at least one district.
Consider any symmetric mixed strategy pair for the two candidates. Since the strategies are symmetric, if information is not revealed, then each voter i abstains when p , thus completing the proof of Proposition 2.
